

Developmental State and the Politics of State-Society Relations Influencing Urban Growth in the 21st century

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Abstract

The concept of developmental state has been transformed over the course of the last thirty years. The notion of the developmental state has been one of the most celebrated and magnetic concepts in development theory and governance now. The successes of the East Asian countries not only brought the concept into vogue in the 1980's and 1990's but changed the conventional notions of having a single predetermined route to development. It challenged the attributes of democracy itself being the road leading to developmental success. While placing the State at the centre of the discourse on development, it is really the capacity of the State to penetrate society and extract resources to become a strong State. Urbanization has always been a part of this development process but now the pace of urbanization poses an unprecedented managerial and policy challenge in India and many East Asian countries. The problem however, becomes much more prominent when it comes to countries like India, where the web like society is heterogeneous and plural, so social control by the State becomes much more fragmented and difficult.

Keywords: Developmental State, Politics, State-Society Relations, Urban Growth

Introduction

The theoretical and empirical work around the 'developmental State' theme has transformed this concept into a general ideal type whose relevance now transcends the East Asian States. The key focus of the developmental debates brought in by the East Asian nations was the success of economic transformation in these countries as it provided a coherent counter to the dominant neoliberal narrative that describes the market as the predominant institution underlying growth and development (Evans, 2012). Since the mid 1980's there has been a keen debate in development studies and international political economy over whether the state or the market is the key factor in explaining the undeniable economic growth and industrial transformation that have occurred recently in the East Asian countries. However both the statist and the neoclassical theories have been incapable and insufficient in explaining the economic outcomes in Asia.

This paper seeks to explain the concept of the developmental state, examining the change in the concept of 'developmental state' over time. It seeks to explore the larger question of whether and how the developmental states combine the elements of an effective state and inclusive development. More importantly this paper explores how the state society relations impact the

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trends and processes of urbanization which happens to be one of the key processes affecting Asian development in the 21st century. It highlights the interaction between state and civil society (state-society synergy and independence) both playing a critical role in the twenty-first Century State to effect inclusive development while accelerating urban growth and economic development.

The immediate consequence of industrialization and economic growth has been the massive migration of population towards urban centres. In the context of the changing meaning of the developmental state, it is important to explore the politics of urban growth in transitional societies particularly the newly emerging late industrialized economies who have been late adopter of urban policy. How the dynamics of state society relations differs in the East Asian countries than the older industrialized democracies which impacts their patterns of urbanization as well. This includes countries like Korea, Japan, China, etc.

Most of the literature around developmental State earlier had focused around economic growth and industrialization as the key aspects in understanding and achieving development. Development involves a lot more than economic growth and that variations in economic growth reflect more than underlying variations in industrial growth. Despite variations by country and by region, the predominant urban political-economic pattern throughout the industrialized world was one of urban growth and economic development. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was massive migration of population towards urban centers along with industrialization and economic growth across Western Europe and North America. In some developing countries what is interesting is how the industrial transformation has also helped the state's economy to promote equity, addressing other areas of concern like agricultural growth and income distribution (Kohli, 2004).

One of the central debates around developmental state has focused on the controversy over how much the states should intervene in the market and the role it should play in promoting development. The nature of the role of the state continues to be argued over. As Kohli (2004) argues how states in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America being active economic actors has engaged in varying patterns of state intervention and this intervention itself has proved to solve certain economic problems while ignoring others and also creating new ones. The consequence of rapid industrialization and urbanization in many developing countries since the 1960s with accumulation of capital and resources within cities has brought parallel issues of growth and sustainable development to the fore. At the same time transitional societies have experienced economic prosperity and urban growth, socio economic change there has brought about the rise of urban middle class, and political change has contributed to the emergence of citizen groups and democratic politics (Park et al., 1999; Shatkin, 2004; Wu 2003; Zhang, 2002).

A number of accounts highlight that the local business elites and economic organizations are crucial to economic development and local growth in developing and transitional societies, but in a different and distinctive manner than the developed countries of North America and Western Europe (Evans, 2002, Wu, 2003). It is only a closer scrutiny of urban dynamics in these societies that needs to take into account the major contextual contrasts in capitalist systems, state-society relations, the nature of local businesses and the temporal context of urban policy (Clark, 2000, Evans, 2002).

The role of the State continues to be argued over. As Evans (1995) points out in his book 'Embedded Autonomy' the question not being how much State intervention but of 'what kind'? This is as Routley (2012) rightly asserts, is in terms of examining the social and political aspects of what has worked, rather than discussing in detail the industrial policies, market liberalization and the contestations of State interventionist perspectives. Evans (2012) argues that the role of the

developmental state has changed due to the change in development theory. ¹Amartya Sen's (1999) capability approach seems to converge with the modern understanding of growth.

Evans states:

...traditional mid twentieth century economic thinking was often read as arguing that the accumulation of capital was the driver of growth and growth was the cause of improvement in health, education and well-being. Current research on economic growth emphasizes improvements in human development indicators as causing growth in income (Evans 2012, 5).

The Developmental State: Meaning and Background

While Evans (2012) expands the very notion of development in the context of the developing world, firstly it is important to understand the meaning and the background to the concept of the 'developmental state'. "A developmental State has sufficient state capacity to be effective in its targeted areas and has a developmental vision such that it chooses to use this capacity to work towards economic development" (Routley, 2012, 8).

Leftwich (1995) defines developmental states as states whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing the conditions and the direction of economic growth, or by organizing it directly or a combination of both. Basically stating how developmental objectives of the institutional structures have been politically driven. These conditions that are promoted or established as Leftwich (1995) elucidates, are the characteristics that distinguish a developmental state, which possesses a determined developmental elite who have intimacy and linkage of the bureaucratic (civil and military) and political components, like in Japan. Leftwich illustrates with examples of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yen in Singapore, President Khama and Masine in Botswana, etc.... In Malaysia the close links between the civil service and political elite has resulted in a high degree of civil service influence in policy making. Therefore stating what a pivotal and crucial influence the bureaucracy may have in developing policy for pursuing developmental objectives in a State.

The implicit idea of a developmental state can be traced to theories put forward by Friedrich List (1885) who argued that the less advanced nations needed to use their state led approach to catch up with the advanced nations in order to accomplish the economic development of the nation and to prepare it for admission into the universal society of the future (Leftwich 1995). The extraordinary economic success of East Asian countries- especially Japan, South Korea and Taiwan- in the post-war period raises both scholarly and practical inquiries regarding the question, "How did those 'backward' countries accomplish such unprecedented fast economic growth, although in fact, the fundamentals of their industrialization strategies and policies were similar to other developing countries?" (Amsden, 1989; Gerschenkron, 1962).

The conventional argument regarding East Asian economic miracle was that the countries faithfully followed market principles in their industrialization process. However, in truth, tremendous economic growth in these countries was the result of a different pattern of management of institutions on which rapid industrialization was based. Unlike earlier industrializers such as the UK

¹ Sen (1999, 18) argues that "well-being" involves more than increasing contentment or reducing suffering; it involves the capacity of human beings to do the things that they want to do. Thinking in terms of "capabilities" rather than just "well-being" draws our attention to the fact that human capabilities are both ends in themselves and the key means to intermediate goals, such as economic growth and the construction of democratic institutions that help us to "lead the kind of lives we value".

and the US, the strong state intervention in the markets of these late developing countries worked exceptionally well to subsidize, monitor, and guide the private sector in achieving economic growth (Amsden, 1989, Pempel, 1999, Woo-Cumings, 1995).

Johnson (1991) describes the political objective of the Japanese developmental State first understood as fulfilling its nationalist objective as a late developer concerned to protect and promote itself in a hostile world and arising from the desire to achieve the status of other developed nations by taking part in industrialization which enables a nation to compete globally and be treated as an equal.

The developmental State is essentially a model of a particular type of State first laid out by Chalmer Johnson (1991) whose ideal model of the Japanese developmental State, was pre-eminent in setting substantive and economic goals, as it has been a “plan oriented market economy’. Johnson argues that the Japanese developmental state was the power and autonomy of its elite bureaucracy centered in Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. But the Japanese state was mainly characterized by agreed policy goals determined by the bureaucratic elite rather than the politico-legislative elite. As Johnson puts it describing Taiwan...” the politicians reign and the State bureaucrats rule” (Johnson, 1991, 32). Parallel to accounts of the Japanese economic miracle from the 1950s to the 1960s, work on Korea also demonstrates how ubiquitous and highly capable bureaucrats controlled the national finance and monetary system through the Economic Planning Bureau (EPB) and the Korea Bank (Bae, 2007).

Concept of Autonomy and the Success of the Developmental State

The concept of relative autonomy would mean that the State has been able to achieve relative independence from the demands of special interest groups i. e. class, regional, sectoral and override these interests in the larger putative national interest. It is the relative autonomy of the elites and the state institutions which they command. However, this autonomy here does not mean isolation but in Evans (1989) is more like ‘Embedded Autonomy’ which means that despite the power and autonomy of state bureaucracies, they have become embedded in a progressively dense web of ties with both non-state and other state actors (internal and external) through which the state has been able to co-ordinate the economy and implement developmental objectives. (Evans, 1989; Leftwich, 1995).

Britain, Germany and the United States which experienced industrial revolution in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries relied upon continuous ‘invention and innovation’ of technological knowledge. In contrast, backward countries in the twentieth century did not have such foundations and resources of technological advancement. Those which succeeded in transforming their industrial and economic structure to raise productivity employed ‘borrowed’ knowledge from the earlier industrializers (Amsden, 1989). In applying this knowledge to the development of production technology and capital resources, these countries relied upon the intervention of a powerful state (Gershenkro, 1962, Hill and Kim, 2000).

As developmental state theorists have argued, highly educated and experienced state bureaucrats mobilized and allocated resources to firms selected for their competitive advantage against industries in advanced countries-especially export oriented companies (Evans 1992). Bureaucrats were not only executors of the will of lawmakers but setters of national goals and standards, and the standards they drew upon international experience (Pempel, 1999, Woo Cumings, 1995). The late industrializers rapidly emerged in the global market place that the advanced economies had already established and posed strong challenges to them with cheaper labour forces and competitive products.

The internal autonomy of some of the States like Korea in relation to their society has been strengthened also by the inflow of large amount of foreign aid loans (especially from the U.S) and the State directed private investment also reduces the government's dependence on locally generated revenue capital. Thus, channelling of both aid and these private loans through State machinery simultaneously enhanced its development capacity and autonomy.

What differentiates the success of the East Asian Capitalist developmental State is the economic bureaucracy which wields real power, authority, technical competence, insulation in shaping developmental policy- e.g. Taiwan and Korea. These developmental states are characterized by generally a weak civil society which appears to be the continuity of developmental states. But paradoxically after the economic success of these states it has promoted the growth of potentially active civil society. Leftwich (1995) asserts that the successes of the States have helped to stimulate demands for decentralized decision making, greater individual liberty and the establishment of democracy which may raise questions about the future of the developmental States.

It seems almost ironical and surprising that while many scholars are of the view that vibrant civil society, democracy, public deliberation is the only route to enhancing capabilities and managing the negative impact of poverty, globalization through equitable distribution. According to Routley (2012, 33), Korea and Taiwan which initially had a weak and subordinated civil society and took a non-democratic route through the bureaucratic state apparatus achieving relative autonomy, have been maximizing their capability expansion in the neo-liberal era. Evans (2012) argues that these states even in their initial drives for industrial transformation have been pioneers in capability expansion renowned for their levels of investment in human capital.

The Politics of Urban Growth in Korea and its State- Society Relations

The Korean case demonstrates the legacies of statism playing a crucial role in the gradual evolution in the politics of urban development in Korea from the 1980s to the end of the 1990s. Koyang as it exists today is a product of the decision of the authoritarian central government of the 1980s to develop new towns outside the Seoul Metropolitan Areas to relieve overpopulation and environmental degradation. This successful policy drew partly on the experiences of western democracies, especially the UK. After the mid-1990s, when democratization at the national level led to the institutionalization of local democracy in Korea, the conjuncture of ongoing economic and political the urban growth politics in Korea that was both similar to and different from the case of the United States and Western Europe.

Over the 1980s, with the decentralization of planning and other authorities in France, the local politics for growth also shifted from a statist to a market-oriented pattern that more closely resembled arrangements in U.S cities (Levine 1994; Sellers 2002). As in France, the combined effect of the institutional legacies of the Korean developmental state and democratization has generated pro-growth coalitions around the mayor rather than rentier interests. Even as the mayor increasingly occupied the pivotal position in the pro-development coalition, hierarchical supervision by supralocal governments persists. The newly elected mayor in Koyang endeavoured to develop the city by attracting national facilities or businesses. Rentiers and local businesses became strong supporters to the mayor's policy, but their influence was limited. As a consequence, the pro-growth coalition in Koyang became a mayor-centered coalition.

In Korea, the contemporary industrial development-especially in high-tech industries-spawned an educated middle class like that of the post-industrial U.S and European societies. This development proved crucial for the movement to limit local growth. As the developmental state creates a highly trained and technically sophisticated workforce, and houses it in new towns like Koyang, the resulting new concentration of middle-class families shared a culture of concerns about the quality

of life and a growing commitment to civic activism (Clark and Hoffman- Martinot 1998). These residents ultimately comprise potentially powerful new constituencies of movements that take advantage of the opportunities in growth management. This balance between pro-growth coalition and growth management have not been possible with land-use control policies such as the New Town, Green Belt, and planning regulations that served under the prior regimes as a tool of authoritarian control. The policies were adopted in a very different political context of an authoritarian set up of the State mobilized around export led development and these policies became part of the opportunity structure under democracy that facilitated effective local challenges to local development.

The emerging patterns of urban growth politics in Koyang resembled those in the cities of advanced economies in many respects in a short span of a decade. The Mayor, local businesses and rentier mobilized around developmental initiatives in a manner analogous to growth coalitions in the U.S or France. At the same time, an understanding of the distinctive features of growth politics in Korea, show the forces and dynamics beyond the local level where the State plays a dominant role in bringing about industrial transformation in the society. Rapid industrialization, democratization and post- industrialization on the one hand, and the legacies of state intervention and late policy development on the other, have created conditions for local growth politics in Korea that remain distinct from those of earlier industrializers.

Classification of States and their Interaction with Civil Society

Different scholars have classified the developmental states into different types through the use of political variables. Gordon White (1984) classifies the states into three types- State Capitalist, Intermediate and State socialist. The political variables he uses extends from political sociology of the state like the nature of social forces and interest that shape the state, second the state's political, administrative and technical capabilities and thirdly the mode of state's involvement in political economy. The way these variables combine and intersect determines the typology of the state in the classificatory scheme. This classification is a simple one which doesn't take into consideration the authority of the State being organized and used in significant ways to influence the developmental goal of the State.

Kohli (2004) in his book *State Directed Development* refers to three kinds of State authority being organized and used in the developing world and classifies the states on this basis- Neo-patrimonial States, Cohesive Capitalist States and Fragmented multi-class States. His description of the Neo-patrimonial states coincides with what Evans (1995) characterizes as predatory states and Leftwich (1995) as patrimonialism, where there is barely a legitimate authority structure and public office holders treat public resources for personal gains. There is corruption on a massive scale proving to be detrimental to the growth and development of these States, e.g. Thailand, Indonesia, Nigeria etc.

Kohli's description of the Cohesive Capitalist States are those who can be called developmental States- they have a centralized and purposive authority structures which are embedded deep into society. This is when the twentieth century State's interaction with industrial elites gave these elites a reason to become a more collectively coherent class. "Effective state-society linkages depend on the organization of civil society as well as on the capacity of the State, but the state can help facilitate the organization of civil society" (Evans, 2012, 9).

The drawbacks faced by South African States, in its route to developmental success is the wide disparity between the political and civil society. The goal of capital accumulation is diverted to black economic empowerment making the Capitalist elite more multi-racial rather than maximizing its profits. While the State built ties to capital, the State failed to enable civil society to engage in the co-production of capability expansion.

The Indian State's hurdle on the road to development is because of the lack of broad based embeddedness that has undermined the capacity of the State to translate growth into capabilities under democratic conditions. Gurcharan Das (2012) in his blog *Street Protests awaken people but do not solve the problems* has argued that "India is an example of private success and public failure", what is problematic in the Indian state case is its lack of accountability of institutions and government structures where the drive for developmental objectives is entirely missing. Das asserts that "politics in India has kept us back, but that is the price you have to pay in a democracy".

The problem with the Indian democracy is that it has to facilitate accumulation with legitimacy by translating growth through expansion of human capabilities. Democracy in itself has been seen as problematic for the emergence of developmental state due to the short term that electoral politics can breed, as opposed to the long view that those pursuing a developmental vision in developmental states can take. India may be an adequate description of a multi-class fragmented state where the State has to fulfil multiple goals therefore it leads to a more diffused focus failing to meet its required objectives.

Urbanization is part of the development process which is again a major concern for policy makers and bureaucrats in India. While the public policy on urbanization encompasses a wide range of issues of land, economy, infrastructure, environment, management and many others, the coordination of these issues has become a difficult task for urban development management authorities (Sharma 2014). The political leadership in India has provided an ad hoc and piecemeal approach to meeting the challenges of urbanization in this country. India has yet to address issues of Decentralization, Community Welfare and Capacity Building in Development Management Paradigm for the purpose of achieving a more inclusive development. (Sharma, 2014).

The State society synergy and collaboration can also prove to be productive like the case of Kerala where vigilant and dynamic civil society has led to increase in efficiency and well-being of the whole State. It shows the ideal collaboration between the institutional and societal arrangements working for capability expansion and achieving developmental objectives. States in the twenty first century have to balance economic growth with redistribution for social inclusion which is their biggest challenge, to discover the kind of state capacity that will have order, legitimacy and will be successful in economic management of resources for social inclusion. State capacity is the means to achieve the end i.e the developmental state. "Economic outcomes of a State are products of social and political institutions and not just responses to prevailing market conditions" (Evans, 1995, 18).

There is also another dimension to State society synergy, which comes from increasing responsiveness of the citizens for good agency performance. Extensive involvement of the citizens in a project and coordination between citizen and the agency can only determine the level of success of implementation of a project. Ostrom (1996) brings out the concept of co-production and its importance in polycentric systems for synergy and development by comparing cases in Nigeria and Brazil. Coproduction implies that citizens play an active role in producing public good and services that are of consequence to them. The two extreme cases, one of Brazil where public officials encourage high levels of citizen participation in decision making, and other is Nigeria where citizens are discouraged to participate in the role played by the State. Ostrom highlights how co-production has increased welfare of the citizens, maximizing the limited resources and budget constrains to obtain substantial benefits, enhancing accountability mechanism for good performance.

The problem with generating co-production is that technologies must be used to generate a complimentary production possibility frontier. Co-production is a technique that works both ways creating a synthesis between regular government production and citizen participation and production. There are technological and operational problems in achieving co-production in

developing states like the need to enhance the productivity of inputs from the public sector itself while motivating citizens and coordinating the efforts of diverse inputs from both sides (Ostrom, 1996).

Another problem with state-society relations is what Scott (1998) describes as “high moralism” an ideology, a faith that was given to redesign societies and a comprehensive planning of human settlement and production which was based on the legitimacy of science and technology. He describes the ‘imperialism of high modernism’, and its lack of effort in understanding the local practices of a society, has led to failure in improving people’s lives. Authoritarian solutions to production and social order inevitably fail when they exclude the fund of valuable knowledge embodied in local practices. The failure of schemes to improve human condition is because of the over reliance of planning and social organization of societies according to the ‘high modernist view’ and also meet the interests of the political officials as their view of development.

Evans also affirms this by stating that “states are not generic; they vary in their internal structures and relations to society. The structure defines the roles of the state and the outcomes depend on how well the roles fit the context as well as how well the State has executed these roles” (Evans, 1995, 18).

In a State like India, political leaders drawing their legitimacy from what Morris Jones (1963) describes as the three political idioms of ‘the modern’, ‘the traditional’, and ‘the saintly’ ways has led to a certain ignorance and misrepresentation of the National schemes among the poor in certain states by the political leaders where they command legitimacy through these idiosyncrasies. The description of the patron-client relationship among the political and civil society in U.P is an example of this phenomena, which can be classified as a neo-patrimonial State.

Unfortunately in India the workings of a participatory development scheme will be shaped more by existing political networks than it will by village based stock of social capital. The dealings of politicians and bureaucrats will affect efforts by the State to disseminate information to the grassroots and will largely shape the ways in which the benefits of a development project are made available to different groups of villagers (Veron, Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava 2012, 3).

The boundaries between state and society are sometimes insufficient and inadequate to describe lived realities citizens ordinarily experience as “States” in their everyday lives. The ways in which the State is discursively constructed and symbolically represented to people needs to be re-examined. Gupta (1995) problematizes the Eurocentric unitary description of the State. He argues that in the analysis of the State, it requires us to conceptualize a space that is constituted by the intersection of local, regional, national and transnational phenomena, highlighting the role of public culture in the understanding and construction of the State.

Conclusion

Citizen participation and State accountability are one of the key aspects that have led to change in the developmental perspectives by embracing contextual dynamics in the understanding of the ‘developmental state’. The shift in the notion of development from the neoliberal era has marked a significant change in the understanding of development by incorporating ‘capability expansion’ of its citizens. The interaction between state and civil society has played a crucial role in changing developmental states, by decentralizing administration to make government more flexible and also left room for participatory democracy through citizen participation making state goals more inclusive. The shift from the East Asian model of development which consolidated state’s control of people’s lives by raising income and focusing only on economic growth through industrialization. The

definition of developmental state changes with significant stress now on “people” as both measures and determinants of development.

Rapidly industrializing economies and democratic transitions in newly developing countries provide the most favourable circumstances in which urban growth politics are likely to occur as the U.S cities experienced. The important analysis has been to show the necessity of situating any analysis of the local politics that result, in its wider global and national context. The East Asian countries demonstrated a model of the ‘developmental state; which furnishes a multilevel analysis for a combination of global, national and local factors in enabling growth and promoting urbanization. Its route to developmental goals was unusual, facilitated by a strong State through efficient bureaucracy determined in attaining the growth politics of developed countries like the U.S. The politics of urban growth and industrialization in developing countries like the East Asian model of the developmental state provides an important insight into how their politics of growth and transformations differ from that applied by the Western model of the development. The politics of urban growth has differed as well as resembled the patterns of developed countries like the U.S as the politics of growth and industrialization was consolidated by the authoritarian government at the national level influencing and promoting decentralization and democracy at the local level.

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